

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 ACDA-10 AEC-05 IO-03 OMB-01 SPC-01

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INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

S E C R E T USNATO 721

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: FLANK SECURITY

REF: STATE 25375

SUMMARY: TURKISH DCM (TULUMEN) CALLED ON MISSION OFFICER ON FEBRUARY 8 TO EXPRESS CONTINUING INTEREST IN FINDING A WAY TO MEET ANKARA'S CONCERNS OVER THE THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE FLANKS RESULTING FROM REDEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET FORCES WITHDRAWN FROM CENTRAL EUROPE AS A RESULT OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT. HE SAID THAT ANKARA ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO STUDY OF MEASURES FOR THE FLANKS IN PARA 30 OF BASIC ALLIANCE POSITION ON MBFR AND ASKED THAT US DEFER STUDY ON A GENERAL PROVISION UNTIL AFTER COMPLETION OF EXAMINATION OF MEASURES. MISSION OFFICER DEFENDED CONCEPT OF A GENERAL PROVISION, WHICH HE THOUGHT MIGHT BETTER
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PROTECT TURKISH SECURITY INTERESTS THAN WOULD PARA 30 MEASURES, WHICH WOULD PROBABLY BE NON-NEGOTIABLE AND NON-VERIFIABLE, SUGGESTED THAT STUDY OF PROVISION AND STUDY OF MEASURES PROCEED IN PARALLEL. HE SAID HE WOULD SEEK FURTHER WASHINGTON VIEWS ON

PARA 30 MEASURES. ACTION REQUESTED: AS

DISCUSSED IN PARA 6 BELOW, MISSION BELIEVES WASHINGTON SHOULD PREPARE A PAPER SETTING FORTH COMPREHENSIVELY THE US POSITION ON SECURITY OF THE FLANKS IN MBFR. REQUEST GUIDANCE ON WHETHER WE CAN ASSURE TULUMEN THAT SUCH A PAPER WILL BE FORTHCOMING. ALSO REQUIRE GUIDANCE ON PLACING WITHDRAWN SOVIET FORCES INTO RESERVE. END SUMMARY

1. TULUMEN SAID HE HAD ATTEMPTED TO EXPLAIN TO ANKARA THE GENERAL APPROACH UNDERLYING THE US PROPOSAL FOR A GENERAL PROVISION ON UNDEMINISED SECURITY IN AN MBFR AGREEMENT. ANKARA REMAINS SUSPICIOUS, HOWEVER, THAT THIS WAS JUST AN EFFORT TO BURY ALLIANCE STUDY OF PARA 30 MEASURES. HE WAS PERSONALLY AWARE THAT ALLIES MIGHT NOT END UP WITH MUCH MORE THAN SUCH A PROVISION, BUT, TO MEET ANKARA'S CONCERNS, HE CONSIDERED IT ESSENTIAL TO HAVE A MORE DETAILED EXAMINATION FIRST OF THOSE MEASURES. HE BELIEVED HE WAS REFLECTING AS WELL THE VIEWS OF GREECE AND NORWAY, WHO ALSO WANT STABILIZING MEASURES TO THE FLANKS.

2. TULUMEN ADDED THAT PART OF THE PROBLEM WAS ONE OF COMMUNICATION. THE US HAD MADE ITS POSITION KNOWN ON SPECIFIC POINTS AT VARIOUS TIMES ON THE FLANK ISSUE, BUT THAT NOT EVERYONE IN ANKARA, PARTICULARLY

NOT THE NEW GOVERNMENT, HAD THIS INFORMATION AT HIS FINGERTIPS. HE HAD TRIED TO MAKE ANKARA UNDERSTAND US VIEWS, BUT, FRANKLY, HE WAS GETTING TIRED OF DEFENDING THE US POSITION TO HIS AUTHORITIES. MISSION OFFICER HOPED THAT THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT TULUMEN WAS REJECTING CONSIDERATION OF A PROVISION OF AN AGREEMENT. TULUMEN REPLIED THAT WORK COULD PERHAPS GO ON IN PARALLEL, BUT ASKED MISSION OFFICER NOT TO PRESS TOO HARD ON PROVISION STUDY AND TO AVOID TERM "GENERAL" PROVISION.

3. MISSION OFFICER SAID, ON A PERSONAL BASIS, THAT THE US PROPOSAL FOR A GENERAL PROVISION COULD BE A BETTER WAY TO PROTECT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE FLANKS THAN A SERIES OF MEASURES WHICH WERE PROBABLY NON-NEGOTIABLE AND NON-VERIFIABLE. IN HIS VIEW, THE ALLIES IN VIENNA COULD, THROUGH A SERIES OF
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INTERVENTIONS BUILD UP A NEGOTIATING RECORD OF EXPRESSIONS OF ALLIANCE CONCERN OVER PRESERVATION OF THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE FLANKS. THIS PROCESS WOULD PROVIDE A SOLID POLITICAL BASIS ON WHICH TO INTRODUCE A SUBSEQUENT PROVISION ON UNDIMINISHED SECURITY IN AN MBFR AGREEMENT. IF SUBSEQUENTLY SOVIET REDEPLOYMENTS RESULTING FROM MBFR--WHICH THE ALLIES WOULD MONITOR CLOSELY-- APPEARED TO THREATEN THE SECURITY OF THE FLANKS, THE ALLIES WOULD THEN HAVE A FIRM POLITICAL BASIS ON WHICH TO CHALLENGE THE USSR. SUCH A "POLITICAL" APPROACH COULD GIVE ANKARA GREATER LEVERAGE VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS THAN WOULD PARA 30 MEASURES, WHICH COULD ALSO HAVE THE EFFECT OF INHIBITING THE ABILITY OF THE US TO DEFEND THE FLANKS. HE HOPED, THEREFORE, TULUMEN WOULD NOT REFUSE TO PARTICIPATE IN ALLIANCE CONSIDERATION OF SUCH

A PROVISION, ON WHICH HE HOPED TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION WITHIN A FEW WEEKS.

4. COMMENT: TURKISH DELEGATION HERE HAS BEEN HELPFUL IN EFFORTS TO FIND

COMMON GROUND ON FLANK ISSUE, AND WE GIVE CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT TO TULUMEN'S WARNING THAT ANKARA IS HAVING DIFFICULTIES UNDERSTANDING US POSITION. WE BELIEVE MOST USEFUL THING TO TURKISH DEL WOULD BE A SINGLE COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT OF US APPROACH TOWARDS FLANK SECURITY ISSUE ON MBFR. SUCH A PAPER WOULD BE USEFUL TO MISSION AS WELL IN WORKING WITH TURKS AND OTHER FLANK COUNTRIES AND, WE SHOULD THINK, TO US EMBASSIES IN FLANK CAPITALS.

5. WE SUGGEST, THEREFORE, THAT WASHINGTON PREPARE SUCH A DOCUMENT WHICH WE COULD PROVIDE TO TURKISH DELEGATION, PERHAPS CONTAINING THE FOLLOWING MAJOR ELEMENTS:

A. A REAFFIRMATION OF US UNDERSTANDING FOR THE CONCERNS OF THE FLANKS AND OF THE US DESIRE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE ALLIES TO MEET THOSE CONCERNS;

B. A DISCUSSION OF PARA 30 MEASURES. THIS SHOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE A FLAT REJECTION OF THESE MEASURES, BUT RATHER AN ENUMERATION OF THE POLITICAL, MILITARY AND TECHNICAL RATIONALE REASONS FOR OUR CONCERNS THAT THESE MEASURES WOULD BE DISADVANTAGEOUS NOT ONLY TO THE US BUT TO THE FLANK STATES THEMSELVES; AND

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C. A PRESENTATION OF OUR "POLITICAL" APPROACH, OUTLINING OUR PREFERRED NEGOTIATING STRATEGY AND OUR PREFERENCE FOR A GENERAL PROVISION.

6. AS FAR AS IMMEDIATE NEXT STEPS ARE CONCERNED, SPC WILL DISCUSS TURKISH LETTER ON FEBRUARY 11. GREEK REP HAS ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF US VIEWS TOWARDS THE SECOND ELEMENT IN MEASURE 1 OF PARA 30, I.E. PLACING WITHDRAWN SOVIET FORCES INTO RESERVED. MISSION WOULD APPRECIATE EARLY GUIDANCE ON THAT SPECIFIC POINT. AS FAR AS THE NEXT PRESENTATION IN VIENNA IS CONCERNED, WE INFORMED TULUMEN AND THE GREEK DEL, PER STATE 25375, THAT WE CAN SUPPORT TURKISH PREFERENCE THAT A DIRECT PARTICIPANT TAKE THE LEAD ON FLANK SECURITY ISSUES AT VIENNA. END COMMENT.
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